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Abstract: This paper estimates cost and profit efficiency for Latin American and the Caribbean banking sectors. 
This study also conducts a comparative analysis of the performance of foreign and domestic banks operating in these 
counties. Using a model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), a common cost and profit frontiers with country-
specific environmental variables have been estimated for a panel of 427 banking firms from sixteen countries. The 
empirical analysis reveals the importance of the environmental variables in explaining the efficiency differences 
among countries. The results show that profit efficiency levels are well below those corresponding to cost 
efficiency, implying that the most important inefficiency is on the revenue side. The results further indicate that on 
average foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks.   
 
 
JEL classification: G21; G28 
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1. Introduction 
Banking sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean countries have undergone major 
changes in the last two decades due to the deregulation, financial innovation and automation. 
Resulting from the liberalization efforts, the change in foreign participation in banking in these 
countries in recent years is dramatic. The market share of foreign banks in Mexico, for example, 
increased from 6.2% in 1995 to 75.5% in 2001 (see Carvallo and Kasman, 2004)
1. To understand 
the consequences of this growing market share of foreign banks in these countries it is helpful to 
examine whether foreign banks are more efficient than their domestic counterparts. Despite the 
importance of this question, as far as we are aware no detailed study of it has yet been done for 
Latin American banking systems. Hence one of the objectives of this paper is to investigate the 
differences in efficiency (profit and cost) between domestic and foreign banks in order to provide 
information on comparative managerial performance. Since they transfer know-how, technology 
and expertise, the existence of foreign banks in the sectors may produce positive externalities to 
the sector as a whole by disseminating good practice. 
Several studies have compared the performance of foreign and domestic banks. 
Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) investigate performance differences between 
domestic and foreign banks in eighty countries, both developed and developing, over an eight-
year period from 1988-1995. They find that foreign bank entry was followed by a reduction in 
both the profitability and the overhead expenses of domestic banks. They suggest that foreign 
participation improves the efficiency of domestic banking. Weill (2003) analyses the 
performance of foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks operating in the Czech Republic and 
Poland. He finds that on average, foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks and 
suggests that the degree of openness of the banking sector to foreign capital has a positive impact   5
on performance in two transition countries. Kasman (2004) also finds similar results for the 
banking sectors of the Czech Republic and Poland. However, the banking sectors in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are different from their counterparts in the developed and transition 
countries due to the legal and economic environment. Thus it is worthwhile to compare the 
performance of foreign and domestic banks in these countries for policy purposes. 
A small number of studies have compared banking performance differences across 
countries
2. More recent studies have tried to analyze the profit as well as cost efficiency of 
banking across countries
3. The main problem of the previous cross-country studies is the 
specification of the common frontiers. When the regulatory and economic environments of 
financial firms are very different across countries, it is difficult to interpret the cross-country 
comparisons of the previous papers. In these studies, the specification of common frontier 
ignores the influence of the country-specific environmental factors (structural and institutional), 
which justify the use of a common frontier to compare banking performance differences across 
countries. 
Hence the other objective of this paper is to analyze profit efficiency and cost efficiency 
in a sample of 16 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over the period 1996-2001 using 
Battese and Coelli (1995) approach. An expanded model is proposed which incorporates 
country-specific environmental factors within the definition of a common stochastic frontier. 
Carvallo and Kasman (2004) recently examined the cost efficiency, scale and scope economies 
of banks operating in the Latin American and Caribbean banking industries for the period 1995–
1999 using a stochastic frontier model with country-specific environmental variables. Their 
results suggest that there is a wide range of inefficiency levels across countries.  Our study, 
however, expands the work of Carvallo and Kasman (2004) in two respects. First, since   6
empirical evidence shows that profit inefficiency is quantitatively more important than cost 
inefficiency, it aims to analyze profit efficiency as well as cost efficiency using Battese and 
Coelli (1995) approach.  Second, it also analyzes the differences in profit and cost efficiency 
between domestic and foreign banks in order to provide information on comparative managerial 
performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology and 
econometric specification used to estimate the common cost and profit functions. The data and 
empirical results of the estimation are reported in section 3. Section 4 provides the summary and 
conclusions of the paper including the implications of the findings.  
 
2. Methodology 
  The majority of the studies reviewed in the baking literature focused on the analysis of 
cost efficiency
4. Berger et al. (1995) argue in favor of using a profit function to examine 
efficiency of banking firms. They identify two important advantages of estimating a profit 
function over a cost function. First, the profit function allows an examination of output 
inefficiencies by incorporating the revenue effects of producing incorrect levels or mixes of 
outputs. Second, when there is unmeasured variance in the quality of an output, higher quality 
may be erroneously identified as lower efficiency under cost function estimation since more 
inputs are needed usually to produce the higher quality. The profit function is much less affected 
by this problem since higher quality brings additional revenues that tend to offset the additional 
costs. Since estimating profit function constitutes a more important source of information for 
bank management than the partial vision offered by analyzing cost efficiency, this paper analyses 
both profit and cost efficiency in the Latin American and Caribbean banking systems.     7
The combination of technical and allocative efficiencies is commonly referred to as X-
efficiency and is regarded as a measure of the quality of management (see Leibenstein, 1966). 
Technical efficiency is defined using minimal level of inputs given output and the input mix 
whereas allocative efficiency implies that a firm uses its inputs in the optimal proportions. Cost 
efficiency, which refers to both technical and allocative efficiency, provides a measure of how 
close a bank’s actual cost is to what a best-practice firm’s cost would be for producing an 
identical output bundle under comparable conditions. Profit efficiency is, however, a wider 
concept than cost efficiency since it combines both costs and revenues in the measurement of 
efficiency. Profit efficiency measures the extent to which a firm’s profits fall below the profit of 
the best practice firm
5.  
This study employs the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), introduced by Aigner et al. 
(1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977), to generate cost and 
profit efficiencies for each bank in the sample over the period 1996-2001. These models’ error 
term have two components. The first component is a two-sided classical statistical error term that 
incorporates the effects of measurement errors and things like bad luck, natural or economic 
disasters. The second component is a one-sided variable that captures inefficiency relative to the 
frontier.  
We estimate bank efficiency using the stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli 
(1995) in which inefficiency term is drawn from a truncated normal distribution. The model is a 
one-step procedure in which the stochastic frontier is specified using the Fourier flexible 
functional form while the level of firm inefficiency is determined by a vector of country-specific 
environmental factors that a priori are postulated to affect inefficiency
6. The importance of 
specifying environmental variables in order to avoid bias in efficiency models has been   8
recognized in the banking literature (see for example Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-
Vivas et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002). 
  The model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) offers several interesting 
methodological challenges. First, it controls for environmental differences across countries and 
analyzes the effects of these variables on estimated efficiency scores. Second, it alleviates 
several of the anomalies present in the two-step approach (see Berger and Mester, 1997, for a 
discussion of the limitations of two-step approach). This methodology essentially allows for a 
firm-specific and time-varying intercept shift in the distribution of the inefficiency term, and this 
intercept shift is itself a function of the exogenous environmental variables that vary across 
countries. 
  The model can be expressed as follows   
) exp( it it it it u v x y ± + β =                                  (1) 
where  it y  denotes total costs if  0 ≥ it u  and it denotes profit if  0 ≤ it u ;  it x  is a vector of known 
inputs and outputs; β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated;  it v  are independently 
and identically distributed  ) , 0 (
2
v N σ  random errors that are independently distributed of the  it u ; 
it u  are independently distributed, such that  it u  is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal 
distribution with mean,  δ it z , and variance 
2 σ , that is  ) , (
2
u it m N σ ;  it z  is a  ) 1 ( m ×  vector of 
country-specific environmental variables that are allowed to vary over time; and δ  is an  ) 1 ( × m  
vector of unknown coefficients of the environmental variables.  
The inefficiency effects,  it u , in Eq (1) can be specified as  
it it it w z u + δ =                                       (2)   9
 where  it w  is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and variance, 
2 σ , such that the point of truncation is  δ it z . Battese and Coelli (1995) show that when Eq (1) is 
assumed, the alternative profit efficiency (or the cost efficiency) for an individual banking firm 
can be defined as  
 ) exp( ) exp( it it it it w z u TE − δ − = − =                      (3) 
For the functional form we tried both the standard translog and the Fourier-flexible 
specification (see McAllister and McManus 1993; Mitchell and Onvural 1996; Berger and 
Mester 1997). The Fourier functional form is a global approximation because the sin and cos 
terms are mutually orthogonal, so that each term aids in fitting the function closer to the true path 
of the data. Since formal tests indicate that the Fourier terms are jointly significant, the results 
reported here are those for the following Fourier flexible cost (or profit) function specification: 
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                     (4) 
where tc (Π) is total costs (total profits) of the banking firm in a given year.  i y = outputs (total 
loans, total off-balance sheet items and other earning assets);  j w  = input prices (borrowed funds, 
labor and capital); E = financial capital
7;  l x  = country-specific environmental variables;  i z = the 
adjusted values of the log output,  i Y ln , such that they span the interval  ] 2 , 0 [ π
8,9. Following   10
Berger et al. (1997) we restrict the  i z  to span  ] 2 9 . 0 , 2 1 . 0 [ π π ⋅ ⋅ , cutting 10% off of each end of 
the ] 2 , 0 [ π interval to reduce approximation problems near the end points. To ensure that the 
estimated cost frontier is well-behaved, standard restrictions of linear homogeneity in input 
prices and symmetry of the second order parameters are imposed.  
  The alternative profit function uses essentially the same specification as the cost function 
(Equation 4). In the case of the profit function, the variable to be explained is the net income 
before tax.  Since a number of banks in the sample exhibit negative profits, a constant, of a size 
sufficient to eliminate the negative value is added to the profits of all firms in the sample (θ is 




3. Data and Empirical Results 
In this section, we discuss the data set and present estimates of cost and profit values 
obtained by the translog multiproduct cost and profit functions using a panel of banks and 
financial institutions in 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 1996-2001. 
The countries included with the number of banks in parentheses are Argentina (64), Bolivia (12), 
Brazil (81), Chile (19), Colombia (29), Costa Rica(23), Dominican Republic (22), Ecuador (22), 
Honduras (17), Jamaica (11), Mexico (21), Panama (14), Paraguay (16), Peru (15), Uruguay (20) 
and Venezuela (41). Accordingly we have an unbalanced panel data of 427 banking firms over 
the period consisting of 1853 observations. Although we select banks belonging to seven 
different organizational types (commercial banks, cooperative banks, saving and loans banks, 
investment banks, real estate and mortgage banks, medium and long-term credit banks, and   11




International comparisons of efficiency must be very careful in the selection of data. Not 
only the possible accounting heterogeneity of the variables used has to be considered, but also 
the different specializations and the different environments. In this study, the data is taken from 
Bankscope, a financial database distributed by BVD-IBCA, an international information agency, 
which homogenizes the financial information into a global format and classifies firms in terms of 
specialization, so that the accounting uniformity is guaranteed. 
Although the debate about the definition of outputs used in cost and profit efficiency 
continues, the traditional intermediation approach suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977) is 
followed, where the inputs, labor, physical capital and deposits are used to produce earning 
assets. As some authors recognize, this approach is more relevant for financial institutions, as it 
is inclusive of interest expenses, which often account for one-half to two-thirds of total costs 
(Berger & Humphrey, 1997). Three outputs are used: loans, other earning assets, and total off-
balance sheet items (measured in nominal terms). Technically, off balance sheet items are not 
earning assets, but we recognize that this type of business constitutes an increasing source of 
income for banks and, therefore, should be included when modeling banks’ cost (or profit) 
characteristics. Excluding off balance sheet items would tend to understate total output (Jagtiani 
and Khanthavit, 1996)
11.  
The second type of variables that appear in the cost and alternative profit functions are 
the prices of factors of production. Three prices are used: the price of labor, the price of   12
borrowed funds, and the price of physical capital. The price of labor is calculated as the ratio 
between personnel expenses and total assets. The price of loanable funds is calculated by 
dividing total interest expenses by their corresponding liabilities (deposits, money market 
funding and other funding). Finally, the price of capital is given by operating costs net of 
personnel expenses over fixed assets. Table 1 presents summary statistics.  
 
(Insert Table 1) 
  
  Table 1 also reports average costs per unit of assets and the average return on asset 
(ROA) of banking systems in the sample. The coefficients of variation show greater dispersion 
for ROA than average costs per unit of assets. 
  
3.2. Environmental Variables 
To identify the common frontier, we chose several geographic, market structure as well 
as financial depth variables, which explain the peculiar features of each country’s banking sector. 
Averages of these variables are reported in Table 2. As in Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), 
these variables are categorized in three groups. The first group includes measures of density of 
population, income per capita, and density of demand for each country. Second group includes a 
concentration ratio, average capital ratio, and intermediation ratio. Final group includes a proxy 
for an accessibility of banking services variable and other environmental variables that are 
relevant to determine bank efficiency
12. The list and averages of these variables are reported in 
Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2)   13
3.3. Cost Inefficiency 
The common cost frontier with country-specific environmental variables was estimated 
as specified in Section 2. Parameter estimates are presented in Table A1 in Appendix
13. The 
average estimated cost inefficiency scores across country, time and different size groups are 
reported in Table 3. The results indicate an average cost efficiency of 77.3% for sixteen countries 
considered. According to this estimate it would be possible to reduce costs by about 22.7% 
simply by eliminating X-inefficiencies
14. The banking systems in Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries are operating more inefficiently than the banking systems in the U.S. and in 
Europe. As a matter of comparison, Cavallo and Rossi (2001) examine cost inefficiency and 
scale and scope economies of six European banks, namely France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and UK, found an average inefficiency level of 15.64%. Maudos et al. 
(2002), however, investigate cost inefficiency of 10 European Union banking systems and found 
an average inefficiency level of 17.3%. Berger et al. (1993) discusses that the X-inefficiency for 
the U.S. depository institutions is around 20 percent of the costs. 
The results presented in Table 3 also indicate a wide range of cost inefficiency scores 
across countries. All banking systems display significant level of cost-inefficiency ranging from 
11.6% to 38.9%.  Mexico, Venezuela, Paraguay and Colombia emerge as the least efficient 
countries. Panama and Honduras are, however, the most efficient countries during the sample 
period.  
We also examine the cost inefficiency in the banking sectors of Latin American and the 
Caribbean countries by dividing banks into five asset classes. Results in Table 3 suggest that cost 
efficiency and bank size were very strongly related. The results suggest that the large banks 
(those with assets greater than $5 billion and less than $10 billion) are on average more efficient   14
than other groups of banks in the sample. The less cost efficient banks are the small banks (those 
with assets less than $500 million).  
The average estimated cost inefficiency fluctuates along the six years of our sample. 
Although there does not seem to be a clear trend, banking sector become more cost inefficient in 
recent years.  
As for the organizational types, the results indicate that cooperative banks are the most 
cost efficient among the banks that engaged in traditional banking activities. The results also 
suggest that Real Estate/Mortgage Banks achieved the highest efficiency level. It should be noted 
that about 89% of banks in our sample are commercial banks. 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
3.4. Profit Efficiency 
Parameter estimates are presented in Table A2 in Appendix
15. The results for alternative 
profit inefficiency are reported in Table 4. As in the cost inefficiency, the inefficiency measures 
vary greatly across countries. The results indicate that banks in the Latin American and 
Caribbean banking systems have serious profit inefficiency problem. Overall average of profit 
inefficiency is 0.309. This result suggests that, on average, profits are approximately 30.9% 
below those realized by the best-practice banks.  
As seen in Tables 3 and 4, the profit efficiency levels are lower than those of cost 
efficiency
16. This result is consistent with the previous studies that examined the US, European, 
and Spanish banking systems (see for example Berger and Mester, 1997; Rogers, 1998; Lozano, 
1997; and Maudos et al., 2002). The results suggest that banking system in Panama (12.1%),   15
Dominican Rep. (13.1%), Bolivia (14.0%) and Honduras (15.1%) were the most profit efficient 
during the sample period. Brazil (49.9%), Mexico (42.7%) and Uruguay (40.4%), however, had 
the most profit inefficient banking systems. The range of variation among countries is greater 
than that of cost efficiency. The difference between the least efficient system and the most 
efficient is around 37.8%. In every country (except for Bolivia, Dominican Rep. and Paraguay) 
profit efficiency is lower than cost efficiency. 
Observing the profit inefficiency trend over the six years of our sample, no improvement 
in profit efficiency during the sample period. The results suggest that there is a very strong 
relationship between profit efficiency and bank size. Very large banks were the most profit 
inefficient in the sample. The results also suggest that cooperative banks were the most profit 
efficient among the banks that engaged in traditional banking activities.  
Table 5 presents the evolution of inefficiency (cost and profit) in each country. Although 
there does not seem to be a clear trend in general, inefficiency scores have been increasing in 
later years in most countries in the sample. 
 
(Insert Table 4) 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
We also compare the efficiency of domestic and foreign banks
17. The results for the cost 
and profit inefficiency appear in Table 6 and 7, respectively. Although Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that foreign bank entry was followed by a reduction in both the 
probability and the overhead expenses of domestic banks, the banking literature on the 
comparative performance of domestic and foreign banks generally concludes that domestic   16
banks have an advantage in developed countries (see Berger et al., 2000). The cause seems to be 
the weaknesses of foreign banks, such as cultural barriers or organizational diseconomies 
involved in the operation and monitoring of a bank from a distance. These cultural barriers might 
be expected to play a significant role in Latin American and the Caribbean countries where 
managers of foreign banks often come from developed countries.  
The shareholders of foreign banks in Latin America and the Caribbean are mainly from 
the US and Spain. This gives foreign banks two important advantages over domestic banks. 
Firstly, since the most shareholders of foreign banks in these countries are banks, they can 
provide their know-how, expertise and technology to their subsidiaries, which gives foreign 
banks a clear advantage over domestic banks. Secondly, Western shareholders are more used to 
monitoring bank managers. 
We observe that foreign banks are more cost-efficient on average than domestic banks in 
twelve out of fifteen countries. The mean cost inefficiency score is 21.4% for foreign banks, 
while it is 23.4% for domestic banks. The analysis of the dispersion of efficiency scores shows 
significant difference between two types of banks. Foreign banks operating in the banking 
sectors of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela are 
significantly more efficient than domestic banks. Domestic banks in Bolivia and Chile are 
however, significantly more efficient than foreign banks.  
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
  As seen in Table 7, foreign banks are more profit efficient than domestic banks in eleven 
countries. The results also indicate that the profit efficiency levels are lower than those of cost   17
efficiency. Foreign banks in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay are 
significantly more profit efficient than domestic banks. In contrast to cost efficiency, foreign 
banks operating in Chile are significantly more profit efficient than domestic banks. 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
4. Conclusion 
One of the objectives of this paper is to investigate the profit and cost efficiency of banks 
in sixteen Latin American and the Caribbean countries over the period 1996-2001.  This paper 
also analyzes the impact of the nature of ownership on the banking efficiency of banks in these 
countries. This is an issue of considerable interest, due to the increasing involvement of foreign 
capital in the banking sectors in the region.  
We used a model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) and then specified a common 
stochastic frontier with country-specific environmental variables for a panel of 427 banking 
firms. In cross-country comparison of efficiency, controlling for environmental factors is 
important due to the significant differences in regulatory and economic environment. The 
estimation results show that banking systems in these countries are characterized by an 
efficiency differentiation, which can be ascribed to heterogeneity in the environment as a whole 
and in the structure of firms. Hence, environmental variables appear to play an important role in 
explaining the efficiency differences among countries.  
We then compared the cost and profit efficiency in each country in the sample. All 
banking systems display significant level of cost-inefficiency and profit-inefficiency ranging 
from 11.6% to 38.9% and 12.1% to 49.9%, respectively. The results indicate that the average   18
level of cost efficiency is higher than that of profit efficiency, verifying the importance of 
inefficiencies on the revenue side of banking activity. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
between the two definitions of efficiency was also calculated. The rank correlation coefficient is 
low but positive and significant, suggesting that the most cost efficient banks are also the most 
profit efficient. The results further suggest that the large and very large banks are on average 
more cost efficient than other groups of banks. As for the profit efficiency, the results, however, 
suggest that larger banks are the more profit inefficient.  
The levels of cost and profit inefficiency vary greatly from country to country in the 
region. Among the five big economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela), only 
Argentinean and Chilean bank managers have been successful, on average, keeping costs close 
to the efficient frontier over the period 1996-2001. Brazil has performed around the average, 
while Venezuela and Mexico has performed poorly.  The range of variation in profit inefficiency 
among countries is, however, greater than that of cost inefficiency. Again Argentinean and 
Chilean bank managers have been successful, on average, keeping profits close to the efficient 
frontier during the sample period.  
We finally analyzed the impact of foreign ownership on the banking efficiency. We 
found evidence in favor of the positive influence of foreign ownership on both cost and profit 
efficiency in around twelve countries. We observed that foreign banks operating in seven (six) 
Latin American countries were significantly more cost (profit) efficient than their domestic 
counterparts. This clear advantage in favor of foreign banks can be explained by the fact that 
they benefit from a transfer of banking know-how, technology and expertise, since many mother 
companies are banks, and by better corporate governance exercised by foreign shareholders.    19
The findings of the paper have a clear set of policy implications for Latin American and 
the Caribbean countries. The main conclusion of this paper on the impact of foreign ownership is 
that the degree of openness of the banking sector to foreign capital has a positive impact on 
performance. Hence, entry of foreign banks should be promoted since it, as also shown in the 
previous studies (see for example Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Weill, 2002; 
and Kasman, 2004), increases the efficiency of the system. Since foreign banks transfer know-
how, technology and expertise, the existence of foreign banks in the sectors produces positive 
externalities to the sector as a whole by disseminating good practice. The findings of this paper 
also suggest that banking systems in the region have serious inefficiency problem. Hence, 
competition from foreign banks would increase efficiency of banking system. It may also have a 
positive influence on the macroeconomic performance of these countries, because of the 
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Notes 
1.  The market share of foreign banks has increased dramatically in most Latin American 
countries. Particularly, large international banks like Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 
Santander Central Hispano, Citibank, HSBC Bank, Fleet Boston, ABN AMRO Bank, 
Scotiabank and JP Morgan are very active players across all markets. 
2.  See Fecher and Pestiau (1993), Allen and Rai (1996), Pastor et al. (1997) and Maudos et 
al.(2002), Weill (2003). 
3.  The studies on banking efficiency have mostly concentrated on the analysis of cost 
efficiency, disregarding possible inefficiencies on the revenue side. The objective of 
profit maximization requires both cost minimization and revenue maximization. 
Estimating profit efficiency therefore constitutes a more important source of information 
for bank management than the partial vision offered by analyzing cost efficiency. 
Empirical evidence from a few studies analyzing the profit efficiency of banking 
industries shows that profit inefficiency is quantitatively more important than cost 
inefficiency (see for example Rogers, 1998 and Maudos et al, 2002). 
4.  See Berger and Humphery (1997). 
5.  Following Berger and Mester (1997), two profit functions can be distinguished depending 
on whether or not the existence of market power in the setting of output price is 
considered. The standard profit function assumes perfect competition in the markets for 
outputs and inputs. In contrast to the cost frontier, the standard profit frontier relates bank 
profit to input prices and output prices. The exogenous nature of the price of the output 
vector in the standard profit function has the disadvantage that it assumes the non-
existence of market power in pricing. As indicated by Berger and Mester (1997),   21
alternative profit efficiency is a closer representation of reality whenever the assumption 
of perfect competition in the setting of prices is questionable or when there are 
differences of quality/specialization among the individuals of the sample or when output 
prices are not accurately measured, as is generally the case in banking research. Since our 
sample includes a diverse group of countries with different levels of competition, it seems 
more appropriate to estimate alternative profit function than standard profit function for 
international comparisons. Hence, we estimate only the alternative profit frontier. The 
alternative or “nonstandard” approach to estimating profit frontiers has been applied to 
banks by Rogers (1998), Berger and Mester (1997), Humphrey and Pulley (1997), and 
Maudos et al. (2002). 
6.  See Wang and Schmidt (2002) for a discussion of one-step and two-step methods. 
7.  Following Mester (1996), equity is included in the cost function specification to control 
for differences in risk preferences. If managers from one bank are more risk-averse than 
the managers from other banks, they can hold a higher level of equity than the cost-
minimizing level. Hence, by omitting the level of equity, we may consider a bank as 
inefficient even if it behaves optimally, given the risk preferences of its managers. This 
variable is fully interactive with the output and input price variables. 
8.  The formula for  i z is i Y aln 2 . 0 ⋅ μ − π , where  ) /( ) 2 1 . 0 2 9 . 0 ( a b− π ⋅ − π ⋅ ≡ μ  and [a, b] is the 
range of  i Y ln .  
9.  Since the input prices show little variation across banks we exclude Fourier terms for the 
input prices in order to have limited number of Fourier terms.  
10. It should also be noted that in the empirical analysis most of the estimation is carried out 
using the FRONTIER 4.1 and LIMDEP 7.0.   22
11. A small number of banking firms did not produce off balance sheet items during the 
sample period. Hence, the values like $1000 is added to the off-balance sheet items of all 
firms in the sample. 
12. See Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) for details on country-specific environmental 
variables. 
13. All of the estimated coefficients on the environmental variables (except for the inflation) 
in the estimation of the cost function are significant at 5% level. Hence the environmental 
variables are important determinants of bank costs. The results suggest that banks 
operating in countries with a higher population density are significantly more efficient 
because they face relatively lower costs than banks in less dense areas. The sign of the 
income per capita is also negative, indicating that banks operating in richer countries 
(measured by GDP per capita) are significantly more efficient. A priori the coefficient on 
the deposit density is expected to be negative because greater density implies easier 
access to banking products and services. Our results suggest that increase in deposits per 
square kilometer decreases the banking costs. The average capital ratio (measured by 
average equity level/total assets) is an indicator of the state of regulation in each country. 
The capital ratio has a negative sign, suggesting that a strengthening of regulations would 
lead to lower bank costs. The concentration (Herfindahl) index is positive, which implies 
that banks have higher costs in highly concentrated markets. The intermediation ratio 
measures the cost of producing loans in terms of the amount of required deposits. The 
sign of the coefficient of the intermediation ratio is negative, indicating that higher 
amounts of loans per unit of deposits decrease banking costs. The regression results also   23
indicate that financial deepening variable money/GDP and GDP growth rate have 
negative signs. The sign of the coefficient of urban population is, however, positive.  
14. Our average inefficiency score is a little higher than the result of Carvallo and Kasman 
(2004) because we use different technique, outputs and time span in estimating cost 
efficiency. 
15. All of the estimated coefficients on the environmental variables (except for the average 
capital ratio) in the estimation of the alternative profit function are significant at 5% 
significance level. Hence macro economic factors play an important role in determining 
profit efficiency. The results suggest that banks operating in countries with a higher 
population density are more profit efficient. Banks operating in richer countries are 
significantly less profit efficient. This is an unexpected finding, one possible implication 
is that since bank customers in richer countries are more sophisticated the competition 
between banks may be relatively more aggressive. The concentration index has a positive 
sign indicating that banks are more profit efficient in highly concentrated markets. The 
sign of coefficient of intermediation ratio is positive, indicating that higher amounts of 
loans per unit of deposits increases banking profits. 
16. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the two definitions of efficiency is 
low (0.112) but positive and statistically significant. Hence, the most cost efficient banks 
are also the most profit efficient, although the correlation is very small. 
17. BankScope definition of foreign ownership is adopted in classifying banks into foreign or 
not. One important limitation of the data is that BankScope classifies banks into foreign 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the variables: 1996-2001 
 Average  Standard  Deviation Coefficient  of  Variation 
Total costs (tc) 478226.90  1724427.80  3.61 
Pre-tax profits (Π ) 30813.53  152107.44  4.94 
Total assets (ta) 2664892.87  8672117.08  3.25 
Total loans () 1 y   1311057.65 4498389.00  3.43 
Other earning assets () 2 y   1021799.16 3656498.91  3.58 
Off-balance sheet items () 3 y   358392.02 1318237.25  3.68 
Price of funds () 1 w   0.126 0.093  0.737 
Price of labor () 2 w   0.032 0.026  0.816 
Price of Capital () 3 w   1.830 1.899  1.038 
tc/ta  0.201 0.244  1.216 
Π /ta  0.010 0.049  4.916 
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Table 2. Average Values of Environmental Variables (1996-2001). 
  POP INC  ($)  DEMAND 
($) 






Argentina  13.335 7608.086  30754.479  7.235  0.185  1.310  88.111  0.324  30.208  -0.691 
Bolivia  7.341 1007.028  6144.887  1.328  0.121  0.774  61.504  2.265  49.048  5.504 
Brazil  19.584 3932.583  30833.325  7.469  0.162  4.481  80.348  0.959  28.401  8.200 
Chile  19.753 4829.281  60592.991  3.498  0.229  1.232  85.417  2.327  44.277  4.589 
Colombia  36.092 2276.646  20832.384  1.050  0.172  1.489  74.157  1.322  22.846  13.127 
Costa Rica  73.083 3978.897  98777.776  4.232  0.191  2.176  58.616  3.535  31.944  11.188 
Dominican 
Republic 
169.253 2153.455 116413.211  1.997  0.150  24.946  64.665  4.472  29.447  7.280 
Ecuador  43.712 1442.919  19702.892  1.993  0.116  0.643  62.415  -0.333  24.272  -2.300 
Honduras  56.352 895.458 21625.194  1.227  0.124  0.784  51.990  1.229 41.306 11.584 
Jamaica  232.832 2819.671 309355.189  2.411  0.158  1.152  55.613  -0.455  45.053  10.101 
Mexico  49.133 5106.720  84053.044  16.308  0.155  9.443  74.124  3.583  23.328  14.455 
Panama  37.062 3641.717  35213.727  1.505  0.099  0.833  55.954  2.384  65.954  1.460 
Paraguay  12.928 1543.120  5631.940  1.345  0.157  0.811  55.212  0.194  32.304  6.879 
Peru  19.801 2180.435  13940.370  2.419  0.118  0.803  72.338  1.334  29.558  4.814 
Uruguay  18.760 6095.662  91385.358  2.424  0.117  0.869  91.692  0.712  46.624  8.190 
Venezuela  26.312 4701.270  21263.353  2.028  0.193  3.904  86.812  -0.627  16.526  24.065 
Sources: Bankscope IBCA, World Development Indicators; International Financial Statistics, own calculations. 
Note: INC=Income per capita; POP= Density of  population; DEMAND = Density of demand; INF = Inflation; HHI = 
Concentration (Herfindahl Index); INT=intermediation ratio; AEQ= Average capital ratios; GDPG= GDP Growth; URBAN = 
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Table 3. Average cost inefficiency scores (1996-2001). 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation  Coefficient of Variation 
Countries in the Sample      
Argentina 0.161  0.125  0.774 
Bolivia 0.172  0.124  0.722 
Brazil 0.212  0.209  0.988 
Chile 0.144  0.154  1.071 
Colombia 0.339  0.232  0.686 
Costa Rica  0.151  0.148  0.977 
Dominican Republic  0.182  0.120  0.661 
Ecuador 0.269  0.194  0.722 
Honduras 0.126  0.051  0.408 
Jamaica 0.175  0.113  0.649 
Mexico 0.389  0.290  0.747 
Panama 0.116  0.095  0.823 
Paraguay 0.344  0.228  0.662 
Peru 0.213  0.105  0.494 
Uruguay 0.141  0.147  1.038 
Venezuela 0.379  0.241  0.636 
      
Overall  0.227 0.204  0.897 
      
Trend      
1996 0.197  0.173  0.875 
1997 0.168  0.123  0.730 
1988 0.198  0.175  0.886 
1999 0.251  0.225  0.898 
2000 0.239  0.204  0.854 
2001 0.259  0.237  0.914 
      
      
Size (Million US Dollars)      
0-500               N = 1021  0.240  0.223  0.930 
500-1000         N = 233  0.222  0.202  0.910 
1000-5000       N = 406  0.221  0.185  0.838 
5000-10000     N = 81  0.153  0.074  0.483 
10000+            N = 112  0.198  0.120  0.606 
      
      
Organizational Type      
Commercial Banks  0.226  0.201  0.892 
Cooperative Banks  0.192  0.154  0.804 
Savings&Loans Banks  0.282  0.239  0.848 
Investment Banks  0.286  0.247  0.865 
Real Estate/Mortgage Banks  0.117  0.047  0.398 
Medium- and Long-term Banks  0.266  0.300  1.126 
Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institutions 
0.193 0.170  0.877 
Note: Estimations are based on a common cost frontier with country-specific environmental variables. Our pooled sample data 
includes 427 banking firms over the period between 1996-2001 consisting of 1853 observations. Yearly estimates are simply 
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Table 4. Average profit inefficiency scores (1996-2001). 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation  Coefficient of Variation 
Countries in the Sample      
Argentina 0.206  0.107  0.520 
Bolivia 0.140  0.044  0.313 
Brazil 0.499  0.149  0.299 
Chile 0.194  0.071  0.364 
Colombia 0.340  0.118  0.365 
Costa Rica  0.223  0.118  0.528 
Dominican Republic  0.131  0.046  0.349 
Ecuador 0.273  0.128  0.468 
Honduras 0.151  0.036  0.238 
Jamaica 0.321  0.095  0.297 
Mexico 0.427  0.141  0.331 
Panama 0.121  0.038  0.373 
Paraguay 0.299  0.103  0.344 
Peru 0.232  0.111  0.479 
Uruguay 0.404  0.156  0.386 
Venezuela 0.385  0.191  0.583 
      
Overall  0.309 0.178  0.578 
      
Trend      
1996 0.303  0.181  0.598 
1997 0.306  0.179  0.584 
1988 0.311  0.184  0.592 
1999 0.325  0.191  0.589 
2000 0.289  0.161  0.557 
2001 0.315  0.176  0.559 
      
      
Size (Million US Dollars)      
0-500               N = 1021  0.283  0.168  0.596 
500-1000         N = 233  0.317  0.182  0.575 
1000-5000       N = 406  0.339  0.190  0.560 
5000-10000     N = 81  0.367  0.167  0.455 
10000+            N = 112  0.369  0.178  0.483 
      
      
Organizational Type      
Commercial Banks  0.306  0.177  0.578 
Cooperative Banks  0.263  0.157  0.599 
Savings&Loans Banks  0.297  0.174  0.588 
Investment Banks  0.420  0.199  0.473 
Real Estate/Mortgage Banks  0.175  0.096  0.548 
Medium- and Long-term Banks  0.280  0.114  0.408 
Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institutions 
0.317 0.183  0.576 
Note: Estimations are based on a common profit frontier with country-specific environmental variables. Our pooled sample data 
includes 427 banking firms over the period between 1996-2001 consisting of 1853 observations. Yearly estimates are simply 




   31
Table 5. Evolution of cost and alternative profit inefficiency 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Cost Inefficiency        
Argentina  0.150 0.109 0.160 0.177 0.181 0.137 
Bolivia  0.093 0.099 0.116 0.150 0.241 0.314 
Brazil  0.198 0.177 0.174 0.259 0.206 0.246 
Chile  0.096 0.105 0.115 0.188 0.132 0.203 
Colombia  0.280 0.247 0.315 0.329 0.415 0.384 
Costa  Rica  0.094 0.136 0.118 0.126 0.191 0.172 
Dominican  Republic  0.185 0.145 0.146 0.175 0.214 0.190 
Ecuador  -  0.161 0.168 0.327 0.371 0.303 
Honduras  0.126 0.122 0.117 0.121 0.111 0.148 
Jamaica  0.097 0.141 0.170 0.236 0.191 0.160 
Mexico  0.495 0.241 0.356 0.385 0.371 0.519 
Panama  0.082 0.076 0.089 0.086 0.168 0.162 
Paraguay  0.221 0.172 0.347 0.309 0.332 0.534 
Peru  0.269 0.194 0.228 0.252 0.183 0.181 
Uruguay  0.087 0.087 0.089 0.116 0.149 0.208 
Venezuela  0.294 0.332 0.435 0.435 0.340 0.364 
        
        
Profit Inefficiency        
Argentina  0.158 0.148 0.159 0.190 0.204 0.275 
Bolivia  0.155 0.131 0.132 0.143 0.157 0.120 
Brazil  0.469 0.479 0.531 0.557 0.463 0.491 
Chile  0.191 0.201 0.227 0.197 0.186 0.165 
Colombia  0.374 0.277 0.367 0.361 0.292 0.281 
Costa  Rica  0.215 0.258 0.146 0.155 0.271 0.288 
Dominican  Republic  0.100 0.098 0.103 0.106 0.155 0.170 
Ecuador  -  0.288 0.307 0.355 0.205 0.205 
Honduras  0.174 0.175 0.177 0.160 0.144 0.130 
Jamaica  0.236 0.343 0.289 0.298 0.317 0.370 
Mexico  0.328 0.430 0.435 0.473 0.465 0.360 
Panama  0.109 0.093 0.083 0.083 0.120 0.123 
Paraguay  0.206 0.192 0.311 0.296 0.307 0.377 
Peru  0.234 0.222 0.242 0.240 0.242 0.212 
Uruguay  0.517 0.349 0.367 0.434 0.352 0.483 
Venezuela  0.199 0.360 0.323 0.359 0.284 0.365 
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Table 6. Average cost inefficiency scores by groups (1996-2001) 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation  Coefficient of Variation 
Foreign Banks      
Argentina 0.139*  0.118  0.853 
Bolivia 0.220*  0.151  0.685 
Brazil 0.194  0.194  1.000 
Chile 0.184*  0.223  1.215 
Colombia 0.286*  0.212  0.741 
Costa Rica  0.146  0.057  0.392 
Dominican Republic  0.195  0.061  0.312 
Ecuador 0.259**  0.218  0.844 
Honduras 0.098  0.013  0.137 
Mexico 0.386  0.309  0.801 
Panama 0.087*  0.022  0.255 
Paraguay 0.295*  0.182  0.615 
Peru 0.189*  0.080  0.423 
Uruguay 0.145  0.179  1.235 
Venezuela 0.288*  0.144  0.500 
Overall  0.214* 0.200  0.934 
      
Domestic Banks      
Argentina 0.178  0.127  0.715 
Bolivia 0.151  0.105  0.699 
Brazil 0.223  0.218  0.977 
Chile 0.113  0.042  0.370 
Colombia 0.360  0.238  0.661 
Costa Rica  0.152  0.154  1.012 
Dominican Republic  0.181  0.126  0.695 
Ecuador 0.270  0.191  0.707 
Honduras 0.128  0.053  0.411 
Mexico 0.393  0.265  0.676 
Panama 0.127  0.110  0.863 
Paraguay 0.396  0.261  0.659 
Peru 0.242  0.124  0.513 
Uruguay 0.136  0.080  0.590 
Venezuela 0.405  0.257  0.634 
Overall  0.234 0.205  0.879 
Note: We did not have information on foreign banks in Jamaica. 
* Significantly different from domestic mean scores at 5% significance level. 
** Significantly different from domestic mean scores at 10% significance level 
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Table 7. Average profit inefficiency scores by groups (1996-2001) 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation  Coefficient of Variation 
Foreign Banks      
Argentina 0.201**  0.134  0.667 
Bolivia 0.131  0.026  0.197 
Brazil 0.473*  0.153  0.324 
Chile 0.178*  0.081  0.455 
Colombia 0.334  0.075  0.218 
Costa Rica  0.205  0.087  0.425 
Dominican Republic  0.111  0.019  0.173 
Ecuador 0.293  0.109  0.372 
Honduras 0.111  0.017  0.157 
Mexico 0.439  0.157  0.359 
Panama 0.097  0.024  0.244 
Paraguay 0.270*  0.104  0.386 
Peru 0.193*  0.050  0.259 
Uruguay 0.368*  0.152  0.414 
Venezuela 0.305  0.186  0.611 
Overall  0.316 0.179  0.567 
      
Domestic Banks      
Argentina 0.221  0.083  0.393 
Bolivia 0.143  0.049  0.344 
Brazil 0.517  0.144  0.279 
Chile 0.206  0.059  0.288 
Colombia 0.315  0.131  0.415 
Costa Rica  0.225  0.120  0.536 
Dominican Republic  0.133  0.047  0.356 
Ecuador 0.269  0.131  0.487 
Honduras 0.154  0.035  0.229 
Mexico 0.410  0.116  0.282 
Panama 0.105  0.043  0.407 
Paraguay 0.330  0.093  0.283 
Peru 0.277  0.142  0.513 
Uruguay 0.459  0.149  0.323 
Venezuela 0.335  0.193  0.576 
Overall  0.305 0.178  0.583 
Note: We did not have information on foreign banks in Jamaica. 
* Significantly different from domestic mean scores at 5% significance level. 
** Significantly different from domestic mean scores at 10% significance level 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the common cost frontier with country specific -
environmental variables 
Variable Parameter  Coefficients p-value   
Constant  0 α   -11.644 0.998  -11.669 
1 lnQ   1 α   1.411 0.296 4.768 
2 lnQ   2 α   2.565 0.382 6.709 
3 lnQ   3 α   0.214 0.281 0.760 
1 lnP   1 β   0.510 0.058 8.776 
2 ln P   2 β   0.461 0.063 7.331 
EQ ln   1 γ   -0.084 0.084  -1.009 
1 1ln ln Q Q   11 α   0.073 0.031 2.367 
2 2ln ln Q Q   22 α   -0.044 0.039  -1.136 
3 3ln ln Q Q   33 α   -0.019 0.034  -0.553 
1 1ln ln P P   11 β   0.161 0.009  17.258 
2 2 ln ln P P   22 β   0.179 0.013  14.051 
EQ EQln ln   2 γ   -0.069 0.019  -3.558 
2 1ln ln Q Q   12 α   -0.169 0.008  -21.716 
3 1ln ln Q Q   13 α   -0.009 0.002  -3.967 
3 2ln ln Q Q   23 α   0.002 0.002 1.067 
2 1 ln ln P P   12 β   -0.172 0.009  -18.725 
1 1ln ln P Q   11 δ   0.004 0.007 0.570 
2 1ln ln P Q   12 δ   0.005 0.008 0.657 
1 2ln ln P Q   21 δ   -0.033 0.005  -6.163 
2 2 ln ln P Q   22 δ   0.020 0.007 2.915 
1 3ln ln P Q   31 δ   0.003 0.001 2.032 
2 3 ln ln P Q   32 δ   0.000 0.002 0.062 
EQ Q ln ln 1   1 ψ   0.028 0.011 2.676 
EQ Q ln ln 2   2 ψ   0.039 0.009 4.361 
EQ Q ln ln 3   3 ψ   0.002 0.002 1.040 
EQ P ln ln 1   1 φ   0.036 0.010 3.648 
EQ P ln ln 2   2 φ   -0.036 0.012  -3.020 
) cos( 1 z   1 η   0.597 0.236 2.531 
) sin( 1 z   1 ω   0.897 0.285 3.144 
) cos( 2 z   2 η   -2.241 0.274  -8.172 
) sin( 2 z   2 ω   2.924 0.779 3.752 
) cos( 3 z   3 η   0.142 0.254 0.560 
) sin( 3 z   3 ω   0.428 0.848 0.504 
) cos( 1 1 z z +   11 η   -0.047 0.043  -1.077 
) sin( 1 1 z z +   11 ω   0.146 0.050 2.944 
) cos( 2 2 z z +   22 η   -0.168 0.100  -1.675 
) sin( 2 2 z z +   22 ω   -0.327 0.066  -4.948 
) cos( 3 3 z z +   33 η   -0.076 0.096  -0.789 
) sin( 3 3 z z +   33 ω   0.015 0.065 0.229 
) cos( 2 1 z z +   12 η   -0.094 0.085  -1.113   35
) sin( 2 1 z z +   12 ω   -0.152 0.063  -2.409 
) cos( 3 1 z z +   13 η   0.123 0.038 3.219 
) sin( 3 1 z z +   13 ω   -0.031 0.033  -0.928 
) cos( 3 2 z z +   23 η   -0.035 0.050  -0.690 
) sin( 3 2 z z +   23 ω   0.026 0.032 0.788 
       
       
       
Constant 
0 ζ   1.193 0.478 2.497 
Population density  1 ζ   -0.012 0.003  -4.086 
GDP per capita  2 ζ   0.000 0.000  -5.611 
Deposit density  3 ζ   -0.000 0.000  -4.493 
Herfindahl  4 ζ   0.073 0.013 5.517 
Average capital   5 ζ   -1.707 0.810  -2.108 
Intermediation   6 ζ   -0.440 0.073  -6.002 
GDP growth  7 ζ   -0.105 0.017  -6.158 
Inflation  8 ζ   0.001 0.002 0.543 
Money  9 ζ   -0.090 0.015  -6.092 
Urban  10 ζ   0.012 0.006 2.108 
       
2 2 2
v u σ + σ = σ    0.564  0.070  8.012 
v u σ σ = λ /    0.947  0.007  132.141 
       
Log likelihood function        -53.553 
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Table A2. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the common profit frontier with country specific -
environmental variables 
Variable Parameter  Coefficients p-value   
Constant  0 α   -18.311 0.986  -18.573 
1 lnQ   1 α   8.012 0.475  16.865 
2 lnQ   2 α   -3.424 0.436  -7.847 
3 lnQ   3 α   0.136 0.312 0.435 
1 lnP   1 β   1.142 0.122 9.339 
2 ln P   2 β   0.025 0.124 0.199 
EQ ln   1 γ   0.026 0.181 0.146 
1 1ln ln Q Q   11 α   -0.607 0.058  -10.452 
2 2ln ln Q Q   22 α   0.446 0.045 9.878 
3 3ln ln Q Q   33 α   -0.007 0.037  -0.190 
1 1ln ln P P   11 β   0.084 0.020 4.193 
2 2 ln ln P P   22 β   0.037 0.024 1.542 
EQ EQln ln   2 γ   0.121 0.039 3.088 
2 1ln ln Q Q   12 α   -0.018 0.018  -0.982 
3 1ln ln Q Q   13 α   -0.006 0.005  -1.126 
3 2ln ln Q Q   23 α   0.007 0.004 1.658 
2 1 ln ln P P   12 β   -0.013 0.019  -0.688 
1 1ln ln P Q   11 δ   -0.093 0.014  -6.837 
2 1 ln ln P Q   12 δ   0.067 0.014 4.743 
1 2ln ln P Q   21 δ   0.031 0.011 2.758 
2 2 ln ln P Q   22 δ   -0.053 0.013  -3.916 
1 3ln ln P Q   31 δ   0.007 0.003 2.236 
2 3 ln ln P Q   32 δ   -0.013 0.003  -4.009 
EQ Q ln ln 1   1 ψ   -0.039 0.021  -1.870 
EQ Q ln ln 2   2 ψ   -0.062 0.018  -3.401 
EQ Q ln ln 3   3 ψ   -0.003 0.005  -0.644 
EQ P ln ln 1   1 φ   0.023 0.019 1.183 
EQ P ln ln 2   2 φ   0.031 0.022 1.409 
) cos( 1 z   1 η   -0.078 0.541  -0.145 
) sin( 1 z   1 ω   7.063 0.490  14.421 
) cos( 2 z   2 η   -0.926 0.687  -1.347 
) sin( 2 z   2 ω   -8.260 0.877  -9.414 
) cos( 3 z   3 η   -0.394 0.408  -0.964 
) sin( 3 z   3 ω   0.285 0.935 0.305 
) cos( 1 1 z z +   11 η   -0.762 0.079  -9.590 
) sin( 1 1 z z +   11 ω   0.211 0.107 1.968 
) cos( 2 2 z z +   22 η   0.876 0.134 6.540 
) sin( 2 2 z z +   22 ω   -0.209 0.151  -1.391 
) cos( 3 3 z z +   33 η   -0.043 0.118  -0.360 
) sin( 3 3 z z +   33 ω   -0.075 0.107  -0.701 
) cos( 2 1 z z +   12 η   0.201 0.211 0.954   37
) sin( 2 1 z z +   12 ω   -0.083 0.135  -0.614 
) cos( 3 1 z z +   13 η   0.085 0.081 1.047 
) sin( 3 1 z z +   13 ω   -0.316 0.069  -4.585 
) cos( 3 2 z z +   23 η   -0.198 0.094  -2.100 
) sin( 3 2 z z +   23 ω   0.225 0.070 3.198 
       
       
       
Constant 
0 ζ   1.057 0.882 1.197 
Population density  1 ζ   0.060 0.008 7.720 
GDP per capita  2 ζ   -0.001 0.000  -9.389 
Deposit density  3 ζ   0.000 0.000 8.337 
Herfindahl  4 ζ   0.038 0.013 2.927 
Average capital   5 ζ   0.036 1.013 0.036 
Intermediation   6 ζ   0.650 0.070 9.275 
GDP growth  7 ζ   -0.086 0.019  -4.493 
Inflation  8 ζ   -0.022 0.006  -3.881 
Money  9 ζ   -0.129 0.016  -8.036 
Urban  10 ζ   0.041 0.010 3.898 
       
2 2 2
v u σ + σ = σ    0.917  0.070  13.105 
v u σ σ = λ /    0.884  0.014  62.894 
       
Log likelihood function        -1244.032 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 